This paper compares markets, cooperatives and hierarchies in terms of organizational e¢ ciency. In particular, we analyze the knowledge economics of these three alternative forms of organization. We show that the three alternatives di¤er with respect to the acquisition of general versus idiosyncratic knowledge and with respect to their e¤ectiveness to solve hold up problems. 
Introduction
Today, many industries are dominated by …rms which are organized as business corporations. Owners of these corporations are investors. However, there are other organizational forms such as cooperatives. Cooperatives are typically owned by consumers, workers or producers. The voting power varies among the di¤er-ent organizational forms. In a cooperative, each member has a per capita voting power, whereas in a business corporation the capital investments are decisive. But which organizational form is preferable in a speci…c industry? Apparently, the economic environment has a large impact on the e¢ ciency of an organizational form. Williamson (1979) and Klein et al. (1978) discuss the structure of ownership in relation to speci…c investments.
In this paper, we combine two topics which are often discussed separately in the literature: A cooperative as an organizational form and the transfer of knowledge. We develop a model in order to compare cooperatives with other organizational forms and simultaneously incorporate elements of idiosyncratic and general knowledge.
The particularity of the model is that agents have two random cost components. First, agents'costs are a¤ected by a common component which in ‡uences all agents in an identical manner. This common component could be interpreted as a typical cost element in a speci…c industrial sector. Second, the agents' costs are a¤ected by an individual component. This re ‡ects the fact that every agent is exposed to individual circumstances in a given industrial sector. Nevertheless, the agents have the possibility to invest speci…cally in order to gather information about the two components and subsequently alter the costs'e¤ect. Hence, these investments re ‡ect the incorporation of knowledge into the model as discussed above. We postulate that it is the combination of the organizational form and knowledge which induces a cooperative organization to be more e¢ cient in some speci…c economic environments.
There exists a broad literature both on the theory of cooperatives and knowledge. Bonus (1986) combines both topics. He describes two forces which are critical in cooperatives: On the one hand, there must be bene…ts of collective organization. Bonus denominates these bene…ts as centripetal forces in a cooperative. For instance, members of a speci…c cooperative do not purchase products on their own. Instead, they jointly buy these products by their purchasing cooperative.
On the other hand, there are bene…ts of independent operations leading to centrifugal forces in a cooperative. Bonus points out that economies of scale and some degree of monopoly power are often accompanying the formation of cooperatives. But these motives are not the critical sources from his point of view. He concludes that the availability of local information as well as a 'cooperative spirit' are the driving forces in order to form cooperatives. Bonus emphasizes that trust is a productive resource in a cooperative. All members know that they own the cooperative and that they depend on each other. We resume the importance of local information and knowledge in a cooperative in the next section.
Other authors have discussed the particularity of cooperatives, e.g. Enke (1945) , Phillips (1953) and Hansmann (1988) . Hansmann (1988) compares conventional investor-owned …rms with cooperatives. He concludes that market contracts are costly in case of asymmetric information or market power. Then, a union of …rms might reduce costs. He points out two cost components: Market contracting and ownership costs. In case of a consumer cooperative such as a cooperative book store on a campus, for instance, the market power may be a reason to form a cooperative according to Hansmann. A cooperative is adequate since economies of scales can be exploited. Ownership costs are low since students have more or less long run incentives to buy books in this store and students are easily unionized because interests may be homogeneous. Hansmann also analyzes the farm supply cooperatives in the U.S. and gets similar results as in the cooperative book store example. Contrary to Bonus (1986) , he points out that market power constitutes an important stimulation to form cooperatives in the farm supply business. Porter and Scully (1987) empirically test whether plants in cooperatives are more e¢ cient than noncooperative …rms in the U.S. ‡uid-milk processing market. Their results indicate that self-governed plants are signi…cantly more e¢ cient than cooperatives. According to their empirical tests, a cooperative …rm could increase output by 32.4 percent if it were reorganized as a self-governed …rm without using supplemental inputs.
We have already mentioned that general and idiosyncratic knowledge about …rms'environment might in ‡uence the e¢ ciency of a speci…c organizational form. Idiosyncratic knowledge re ‡ects the knowledge about speci…c circumstances in an individual …rm. This knowledge is highly depending on individual experience and therefore cannot be communicated easily. For instance, consider a farmer managing his crops and cattle. It is nearly impossible to specify adequate behaviour accounting for every possible contingency. However, an experienced farmer will know how to behave in di¤erent circumstances based on his experience.
Another example has been given by Polanyi (1998) who describes the process of learning to ride a bicycle. Even if Lance Armstrong explained riding with physical terminology to a layman, the latter would fall from the bicycle. Both examples emphasize the importance of experience regarding idiosyncratic knowledge. Hayek (1945) postulates that it seems to be reasonable that people working in a speci…c …rm should get the decision rights because they best know the local conditions. He points out, however, that general knowledge often can be communicated between …rms costlessly. A further paper about speci…c and general knowledge has been written by Jensen and Meckling (1995) . They analyze how transfer costs of knowledge in ‡uence the decentralization of decision rights. This paper has the following structure: Section two presents the main assumptions and timing of the model. In section three, we solve the model in three di¤erent market environments. First, we assume that …rms do not cooperate, and a central company acts self-governed as a buyer of the …rms'products. We will denote this case as the 'market solution'because all agents interact autonomously in markets. Second, we examine a market situation in which all …rms are part of a cooperative. This will be called the 'cooperative solution'. Third, we consider a vertically integrated environment in which the central company owns all …rms. By reason of the dominant position of the central company we will call this case as the 'hierarchical solution'. In section …ve, we present two applications of the model and sum up the main results.
Model Setup
We consider a large number of identical and (expected) pro…t maximizing …rms, indexed i 2 f1; ::; ng with n > 1, that have the opportunity to produce two different intermediate products S and V , using two linear production functions. The …rst product S is produced by the linear technology f (s i ) = s i with a convex cost function c s (
1 The output f (s i ) can be sold to a pro…t maximizing monopolist at a price p s chosen by this monopolist. The monopolist transforms the intermediate product into a …nal good. We assume that the monopolist neither incurs costs through this transformation nor has an outside option. Finally, the monopolist resells the …nal good at an exogenous world market price p w > 0.
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As mentioned, …rm i 2 f1; ::; ng also has the possibility to produce a second intermediate product V which can be sold at an outside market at a normalized price p v = 1. The technology for the second product is similar to the technology of the …rst product. Thus, the production function of the second product is given
i . The parameter > 1 re ‡ects the degree of speci…city of investments into the second product. A high implies that marginal costs of producing the second product relatively to the …rst product are high.
A …rm will sell the product V on the outside market if it is not satis…ed with the monopolist's price p s for the …rst intermediate product S. This will be the case if the proposed price p s by the monopolist is too low such that the …rm would realize higher pro…ts on the outside market compared to a trade with the monopolist on the inside market. Therefore, the second product can be interpreted as an investment into an outside option. We assume that a …rm chooses to interact with the monopolist if the …rm is indi¤erent between the monopolist's o¤er and the outside option.
Moreover, we assume that a …rm can either sell the …rst intermediate product S or the second intermediate product V but not both intermediate products together. One intermediate product loses all of its value depending on the …rm's decision on which market it wants to be active. Nevertheless, the …rm is facing the two costs functions c s (s i ) = Why should a …rm invest into its outside option if one product loses all of its value? Consider the following example: The higher a …rms' value of its outside option is, the more a …rm exerts pressure on the monopolist to increase the price p s so that the …rm favours the monopolist's o¤er. For instance, in the European football leagues, 14 clubs have allied in order to increase their negotiating power against the national and international associations (e.g. UEFA). The so-called G-14 clubs threaten to establish a new league. This foundation can be interpreted as an outside option for the G-14. If clubs decide to play anyway in the up to now existing national and international leagues, the value of this outside option is zero ex post. However, ex ante it increases the G-14's bargaining power. Note that the threat implies costs for the G-14 and these costs represent sunk costs.
So far, we have delineated the production side and one part of the costs. Next, we reconsider the cost functions of the model. We assume that the costs consist of two components. Firms generate the …rst cost component c s (s i ) and c v (v i ) by producing the two products as described above. Now, we introduce a second cost component, denoted by c i , which is composed itself out of two elements: The …rst element represents costs which in ‡uence all …rms in an identical manner illustrating a common cost factor denoted e . The second element characterizes a …rm speci…c idiosyncratic cost denoted e " i . We assume that e and e " i are independent, continu-ously distributed random variables with a …rst moment equal to zero and a …nite second moment 2 > 0 and
" > 0 8i 2 f1; ::; ng.
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Moreover, …rms are able to acquire knowledge about the realization of the random variables e and/or e " i by investing an exogenous amount k > 0 and/or k " > 0.
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The realizations of the random variables are denoted and " i , respectively.
We formalize the second cost component c i by the following expression:
The variable x i 0 indicates a choice variable for …rm i in order to react optimally contingent on the information about the realization of the random variables e and e " i . Note that …rm i has an incentive to acquire knowledge about the realization of e and e " i if the learning costs are lower than the expected costs without learning.
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To illustrate the second cost component c i , consider the example of a farmer (representing a …rm) working on his farmland. The harvest is in ‡uenced both by the climate (common cost element) which a¤ects all farmers in an identical manner, and by the quality of the soil (idiosyncratic cost element) which is di¤erent between the farmlands. Now, a farmer has the opportunity to invest into a technology to detect the characteristics of his farmland and/or he could buy some information about weather forecast or the climate at a research institute such that he could optimally (re-)act to the characteristics of his farmland and/or to weather changes.
In the next lemma, we derive conditions under which a …rm has an incentive to invest k and/or k " in order to acquire knowledge about and/or " i :
" then …rm i will invest k and k " to detect and
Proof. Straightforward. The lemma shows that if learning costs are su¢ ciently low, i.e. k 2 and
, …rm i will invest k and k " in order to acquire general and idiosyncratic 3 Since the random variable e re ‡ects the common e¤ect on all …rms it has no …rm speci…c subscript i, whereas e " i is a …rm speci…c random variable with subscript i.
4 Note that we do not explicitely model the process how a …rm acquires knowledge. See e.g. Ba et al. (2001) who analyze the optimal investment in knowledge within a …rm using a GrovesClarke-type double auction. For more about auctions, see e.g. Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Weber (1979) , Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1980) , Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1987) , Hausch (1986) and Rothkopf and Harstad (1994) .
5 See Lemma 1 below.
knowledge to detect the realization of e and e " i . In this case, expected costs
] are minimized by setting x i = + " i and are given by E[c i j
. If, however, only the learning costs k to acquire general knowledge are su¢ ciently low but not the learning costs k " to acquire idiosyncratic knowledge " i , i.e. k 2 and k " > 2 " , then …rm i will only invest k but not k " . In this case, expected costs are minimized by setting x i = and are given by E[c i j
by setting x i = 0.
Equilibrium Analysis
We consider the optimal behavior of the …rms and the monopolist in three di¤erent forms of organization. In the …rst scenario, all …rms act autonomously. They do not cooperate, and the market is vertically separated. The monopolist also acts self-governed. Second, we examine the optimal behavior in a cooperative. There, we assume that the …rms together "own" the monopolist and share the monopolist's pro…t which has to be nonnegative. Third, we analyze a vertically integrated market. In this scenario, a …rm acts as a monopolist's employee. This structure implies that the monopolist owns all downstream …rms. It is important to note that we just focus on the producer side in this model. We abstract from consumer surplus. Thus, in this paper e¢ ciency refers to the aggregate pro…ts of …rms.
Market Form of Organization
In this section, we consider a market form of organization in which each …rm i 2 f1; ::; ng maximizes its pro…t individually. The monopolist also acts autonomously. We model a four-period setup where the timing is as follows: In period 1, nature determines and " i unobserved by all …rms. In period 2, …rm i decides whether to invest k and/or k " to discover the values and/or " i after having observed the exogenous variables (p w ; p v ; k ; k " ; 2 ;
2 " ). Moreover, …rm i chooses both s i and v i . In period 3, the monopolist sets a price p s after having observed the chosen values s i and v i of …rm i and the exogenous variables (p w ; p v ; k ; k " ; 2 ;
2 " ). In period 4, …rm i decides whether to sell the product to the monopolist or to realize its outside option at price p v . Finally, the payo¤s are realized. We solve this model by applying backward induction: In the last period, …rm i sells the intermediate product S to the monopolist at price p s if and only if expected pro…ts are at least as high as expected pro…ts generated in the outside option. 6 The monopolist anticipates this reaction in period 3 and also bears in mind that its own outside option is zero. Thus, the monopolist o¤ers a price p s (if p s 6 p w ) such that …rm i is just indi¤erent between its outside option and selling product S to the monopolist. As a consequence, the monopolist maximizes the sum of revenues p w s i minus costs p s s i over all …rms i 2 f1; :::; ng with respect to p s under the restriction that all …rms prefer this o¤er to the outside option. In period 3, the monopolist thus solves the following maximization problem:
The monopolist chooses the minimum price p s such that every …rm is just indi¤erent between this o¤er and its outside option. We derive the solution to problem (1) in the next lemma:
Lemma 2 test In period 3, the monopolist sets the price for the intermediate product S as follows:
Proof. See Appendix. The optimal choice of p s is
if the monopolist's pro…t is nonnegative. Otherwise the monopolist sets p s = 0. In case of nonnegative pro…ts, the monopolist o¤ers a higher price p s = v i s i if …rms invest relatively more in the outside option. Intuitively, a higher value of the …rms'outside option forces the monopolist to o¤er a higher equilibrium price for the intermediate product S.
In period 2, …rm i 2 f1; ::; ng chooses s i and v i , anticipating the monopolist's price setting behavior according to (2). We have to di¤erentiate two cases in order to derive the …rms'optimal behavior. In case (i), the monopolists sets p s (s i ; v i ) = v i s i and in case (ii) the monopolist sets p s (s i ; v i ) = 0 in period 3.
in period 3. In this case, …rm i 2 f1; ::; ng maximizes its expected pro…ts under the constraint that the monopolist realizes nonnegative pro…ts (otherwise the monopolist would set p s = 0). Thus, …rm i solves the following maximization problem:
The …rst term in the maximization problem (3) represents …rm i's revenue. The second term characterizes the costs of producing s i and v i (…rst cost component). Finally, the third term indicates the expected costs from the idiosyncratic and common cost element (second cost component). The solution to the maximization problem (3) is derived in the following lemma:
in period 2. The price for product S is then given by p s = p w such that …rm i's (expected) pro…t is given by
Proof. See Appendix. The decision of …rm i to invest in idiosyncratic and/or general knowledge depends on the learning costs (k ; k " ) as well as the variances ( 2 ;
2 " ) of the idiosyncratic and common cost element (see Lemma 1).
Case (ii): Monopolist sets p s = 0 in period 3. In this case, …rm i will only invest in its outside option in period 2, i.e. it sets s i = 0 since it anticipates the price setting behavior of the monopolist in period 3. Thus, …rm i solves the following maximization problem:
The solution to the maximization problem (4) is derived in the following lemma:
Lemma 4 test If the monopolist sets p s = 0 in period 3, …rm i will only invest in its outside option in period 2 by choosing (s i ; v i ) = 0;
Proof. Straightforward. The decision of …rm i whether to acquire idiosyncratic and/or general knowledge is similar to Lemma 3.
By comparing (expected) pro…ts from Lemmas 3 and 4, we derive the following proposition:
Proposition 1 test In period 2, …rm i will only invest in its outside option and thus no trade with the monopolist takes place.
Proof. See Appendix.
The proposition shows that the trade between the …rms and the monopolist fails completely in a market scenario since …rm i's (expected) pro…t from a trade with the monopolist is lower than the (expected) pro…t from investing into the outside option only. This replicates the well-known hold-up problem. The …rms anticipate the monopolist's pressure after having speci…cally invested. As a consequence, no …rm will invest in the intermediate product S. The intuition behind this result is as follows: Firm i's revenue is independent of the choice s i because the monopolist sets a price such that the …rm is indi¤erent between selling its product to the monopolist and realizing its outside option. However, …rm i's costs are increasing in s i . Therefore, it is optimal for …rm i not to invest in the intermediate product S, i.e. it is optimal to choose s i = 0.
Cooperative Form of Organization
In this section, we consider an organization form in which all …rms align with each other in a cooperative, i.e. the …rms together "own" the monopolist and share the monopolist's pro…t. It is obvious that in this case, …rms have no incentive to invest in their outside option, i.e. …rm i will set v i = 0.
Furthermore, we assume that the cost k of acquiring knowledge about the common cost element e has to be paid only once by the cooperative since the realized can be communicated to all …rms without any additional costs. 7 The learning costs are then shared equally by the n …rms, i.e. each …rm has to pay 1 n k . We assume, however, that this is not possible concerning the idiosyncratic cost element e " i . Similar to the market scenario, each …rm i 2 f1; ::; ng has to invest k " in order to acquire knowledge about the realization of e " i .
In a cooperative, it is not evident how the price p s is determined. A committee would have to set this price. However, we do not explicitly consider the price-setting mechanism. Instead, we assume that p s is chosen as high as possible so that …rms get the highest pro…ts but under the condition that the cooperative itself makes nonnegative pro…ts. The cooperative's pro…t denoted co is given by the number of …rms n times the revenue per …rm minus a possible investment of k for observing . The timing is similar to the market form of organization: In period 1, nature determines and " i unobserved by all …rms. In period 2, …rm i (cooperative) decides whether to invest k " (k ) in order to detect the value " i ( ) after having observed the exogenous variables (p w ; k ; k " ; 2 ;
2 " ). Moreover, …rm i chooses s i . In period 3, the cooperative sets a price p s after having observed s i and the exogenous variables (p w ; k ; k " ; 2 ;
2 " ). Finally, the payo¤s are realized. In order to compare the market and the cooperative form of organization, we have to distinguish three cases depending on whether it is pro…table to invest k in order to acquire knowledge about the realization of e :
In case (i), we assume that it is pro…table to invest k in both the market scenario and the cooperative scenario, i.e. 1 n k < k 2 . Recall that according to Lemma 1, …rms invest k in the market form of organization if k 2 . In the cooperative scenario, the equivalent condition is given by 1 n k 2 since the cooperative shares the investment costs k equally among the n …rms. In case (ii), we assume that it is pro…table to invest k only in the cooperative scenario but not in the market scenario, i.e.
1 n k 2 < k . In case (iii), we assume that is is not pro…table to invest k neither in the cooperative scenario nor in the market scenario, i.e. 2 < 1 n k < k .
Case (i):
1 n k < k 2 and case (ii):
In both cases, the cooperative will invest k to acquire knowledge about the common cost element e . In period 3, we assume that the cooperative sets the price p s for the intermediate product S such that the cooperative's pro…t co is zero:
We derive that a higher exogenous world market price p w , a larger number of …rms n or a higher s i imply a higher price p s for the intermediate product S. 9 Whereas the price p s decreases if investment costs k for detecting the value increase. In period 2, …rm i chooses s i in order to maximize it's expected pro…t E[ c i ], anticipating the monopolist's price setting behavior in period 3. Thus, …rm i solves the following maximization problem:
The solution to the maximization problem (5) is derived in the following lemma:
Lemma 5 test Suppose 1 n k 2 . In period 2, …rm i will choose (s i ; v i ) = (p w ; 0). The price for product S is then given by p s = p w k n pw such that …rm i's expected pro…t is
Proof. See Appendix. Note that the common cost element e does not appear in the term E[(e " i b x i ) 2 characterizing expected costs for the second cost component. The realization of e is already incorporated in the optimal choice of the variable x i b x i + because the cooperative has invested k and has distributed the information about the common cost element e to all …rms. The decision of …rm i to invest in idiosyncratic knowledge depends on the learning cost k " relative to the variance 2 " of the idiosyncratic cost element. If k " > " then …rm i refrains from investing k " to learn about e " i such that E[(e " i b
Case (iii): 2 < 1 n k < k . In this case, it is not pro…tible for the cooperative to invest k in order to acquire knowledge about the common cost element e . In period 3, the cooperative again sets the price p s such that the cooperative's pro…t co is zero:
Thus, the cooperative sets the price p s for the intermediate product S equal to the world market price p w .
In period 2, …rm i then chooses s i in order to maximize it's expected pro…t
, anticipating the monopolist's price setting behavior. Thus, …rm i solves the following maximization problem:
The solution to the maximization problem (6) is derived in the following lemma:
Lemma 6 test Suppose 2 < 1 n k . In period 2, …rm i will choose (s i ; v i ) = (p w ; 0). The price for product S is then given by p s = p w such that …rm i's expected pro…t is
Proof. Straightforward. In order to derive which form of organization is more e¢ cient in terms of expected pro…ts, we compare expected pro…ts in the cooperative scenario E[ Proposition 2 test A cooperative organization is more e¢ cient than a market organization if and only if the following inequalities hold:
The proposition shows that in the di¤erent cases, the cooperative organization is more e¢ cient in terms of pro…ts than the market organization if (7), (8) and (9) holds, respectively. ad (i): First of all, if the learning costs k to acquire knowledge about common environmental factors are relatively high, then a cooperative organization is more e¢ cient than a market organization. The rational for this result lies in the fact that the costs k for detecting the environmental characteristics are shared among all n …rms in a cooperative whereas in a market solution …rms do not cooperate with each other such that every …rm has to bear its own the learning costs k . Formally, an increase in k by one unit decreases …rm i's pro…t by one unit in the market solution whereas the …rm i's pro…t just decreases by 1 n in a cooperative solution. Moreover, a relatively high number n of …rms also renders a cooperative organization more e¢ cient than a market organization. The intuition behind this result is similar to the former discussion about investments k in general knowledge. The cost per …rm decreases in the number of …rms in the cooperative scenario but remains constant in the market scenario.
Another interesting parameter is the coe¢ cient which characterizes the speci…city of investments into the second product V . A relative high implies that the cooperative organization is more e¢ cient than the market organization. Recall that the parameter also determines the di¤erence of the marginal costs between the two products S and V . An increasing implies that the marginal costs producing the second product V increase. Thus, ceteris paribus a higher reduces the revenue in a market solution because a …rm's incentive to invest in product V decreases in , whereas a higher does not in ‡uence the pro…t in a cooperative organization. Finally, a relatively high exogenous world market price p w for the …rst product S leads to a situation where the cooperative scenario is more e¢ cient. In a cooperative, a high world market price p w is carried forward to the …rms by increasing the price p s , whereas in the market solution the world market price does not in ‡uence …rms' pro…t. A marginal increase in p w increases …rm i's revenue in a cooperative but does not alter …rm i's revenue in a market solution.
ad (ii): Recall that in this case only the cooperative invests in general knowledge but no …rm in the market scenario does so since 1 n k 2 < k . The term 2 1 n k on the left hand side of inequality (8) re ‡ects the di¤erence of …rm i's (expected) costs by not learning about the common cost element e and learning about it.
10 If the di¤erence in (expected) costs between a situation where a …rm knows about general environmental characteristics (cooperative scenario) and a situation where a …rm has no knowledge about these characteristics (market scenario) is relatively high then a cooperative form is more e¢ cient than a market 10 Note that …rm i's expected costs are given by 2 if …rm i does not invest in general knowledge, otherwise costs are given by
The other parameters and p w on the right hand side of inequality (8) have similar e¤ects than in Part (i) of this proposition. The same holds true for Part (iii) of this proposition.
Hierarchical Form of Organization
In this section, we suppose that there is a central company which owns all …rms. Hence, we analyze a vertically integrated market form of organization. Firms become the central company's subsidiaries and do not have any outside option since they are property of the central company. In this setting, the central company is able to dictate each subsidiary's output given by s i . In return, the central company pays a …xed wage w if subsidiary i produces the demanded amount s i . 11 We assume that the central company receives the subsidiary's whole pro…t including its costs except a possible investment of k " .
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Moreover, the central company has to decide whether to invest k in order to acquire knowledge about the common cost element e . Similar to the cooperative scenario, in case of learning, the central company is able to communicate to all subsidiaries without additional costs and the learning costs will then be shared equally among the n subsidiaries. The central company therefore has an incentive to acquire general knowledge if
A subsidiary, however, will never invest k " in order to acquire knowledge about the realization of the idiosyncratic cost component e " i . The reason is that a subsidiary i receives w if it produces the demanded amount s i independent of the subsidiary's pro…t. As a consequence, there is no incentive for the subsidiary to acquire idiosyncratic knowledge since an investment of k " would only lower w.
The timing as follows: In period 1, nature determines and " i unobserved by all …rms. In period 2, the central company decides whether to invest k in order to detect the value after having observed the exogenous variables (p w ; k ; k " ; 2 ;
2 " ). Moreover, the central company dictates subsidiary i to produce s i and pays w to each subsidiary.
The central company maximizes its expected pro…t denoted E[ cc i ] and solves 11 We simplify the problem here by neglecting the possibility of optimal contracting in hidden actions situations. See, for example, Hart and Holmström (1987) for a broad discussion on this topic. 12 We justify this assumption by taking into account that k " represents private monetary costs while the costs 2 " , for instance, indicate losses in physical harvest. This physical loss is carried forward from a subsidiary to the central company.
the following maximization problem:
The solution is derived in the following lemma:
Lemma 7 test The central company dictates subsidiary i to produce s i = p w such that the central company's expected pro…t is given by
Note that the wage payment w only has distributive e¤ects between the subsidiaries and the central company. Addition of the central company's expected pro…t and aggregate wage payments n w, yields aggregate pro…t E[ h ] in the hierarchical scenario as
Comparing the e¢ ciency of the hierarchical scenario with the cooperative scenario, we derive the following proposition: 14 Proposition 3 test A cooperative organization is more e¢ cient than a hierarchical organization if and only if k " < 2 " . Otherwise both organizational forms coincide regarding e¢ ciency.
The proposition shows that a hierarchical organization is less e¢ cient than a cooperative organization if the learning costs to acquire idiosyncratic knowledge are low compared to the expected costs in case of not learning. In that case, the ine¢ ciency stems from the fact that in a hierarchy, the individual subsidiary has 13 Note that if 1 n k 2 , the central company has has paid k and has distributed the information about to all subsidiaries. Similar to cases (i) and (ii) in Section 3.2, the realization of this variable is already incorporated in the optimal choice of the variable x i b
x i + such that e does not appear in the term E[(" i b x i ) 2 . 14 In order to be able to compare both organisational forms, we have to derive expected aggregate pro…ts in the cooperative scenario. no incentive to produce optimally since the subsidiary's wage is independent of its pro…t. If k " < 2 " it would be optimally to invest k " in both the cooperative and the hierarchical scenario to learn about the individual characteristics " i and then adapt the choice of x i accordingly. However, only the …rms in the cooperative scenario invest in learning. Centralization leads to a situation where subsidiaries do not bear the costs of being ine¢ cient.
Conclusion
In this paper, we compare the e¢ ciency of three di¤erent organizational forms (market-, cooperative-and hierarchical organization) in a speci…c economic setting.
Worldwide, food processing is probably one of the most prominent industry which was historically dominated by cooperative organization. We can apply our theory to food processing as follows. Farmers create potential value by producing "raw" food such as cattle, grapes, milk, etc. Historically, these "intermediate" products were time-speci…c: they lost most if not all of their value unless they were processed within short time limits. Without modern refrigerating technology, milk, for example, has to be homogenized and/or pasteurized within hours. A dairy, for example, usually processes all milk from an entire region. In our model, the dairy represents the monopolist. The time speci…city of agricultural products such as raw milk creates a hold up problem. This hold up problem could be solved through vertical integration. If the dairy vertically integrates into milk farming, however, it transforms independent, self-employed farmers into employees and thereby may destroy the incentives to acquire and apply idiosyncratic knowledge. How can the milk farmers remain self-employed while the hold up problem is eliminated through vertical integration? This "dilemma" was solved organizing the dairy as a cooperative jointly owned by the farmers.
Professional sports leagues such as the NFL, NBA, MLB and NHL are also organized as cooperatives. Sports leagues produce sports entertainment and excitement in a two-stage production process. Individual clubs invest in their respective teams, club facilities, stadiums, coaching sta¤ etc. The output of these investments, however, is not a marketable product. A single team is more or less worthless. Each team needs at least one opponent. But single games are also not very attractive. What creates excitement and continuous attention by large audiences is a coordinated championship race. Creating such a championship race requires a league taking clubs'output and transforms it into a coordinated championship race. The complementary services of the league include the de…nition and enforcement of com-mon rules, the scheduling of games, the marketing of the league (especially the sale of TV and merchandising rights), etc. Without these complementary services of the league, each club looses much of its value. This creates the classical hold up problem. One solution to this hold up problem is a vertically backward integrated league which owns all the participating clubs. Such an organizational structure creates a major problem. If all decisions are centralized, the league may lose its integrity. The fans probably want to see a championship race between independent clubs. Value maximization may require a combination of centralized decision-making at the league o¢ ce (e.g. rule-making and enforcement, scheduling, etc.) and decentralized decision-making based on idiosyncratic knowledge at each club. Organizing the league as a cooperative of all participating clubs may solve the hold up problem and guarantee the necessary integrity and decentralization.
In our formal model, we have shown that idiosyncratic and general knowledge have important e¤ects on the …rms'investment behavior. According to the model, the …rms'trade with the monopolist fails completely in a market solution because …rms prefer their outside options. This replicates the well-known hold-up problem. The …rms anticipate the monopolist's pressure after having speci…cally invested.
By comparing a market with a cooperative organization regarding e¢ ciency, we have derived that it is crucial whether …rms have an incentive to acquire general knowledge. In a cooperative, due to economies of scale the costs for detecting environmental characteristics are shared among all …rms, whereas in market organization …rms do not cooperate with each other such that every …rm has to bear its own learning costs. As a consequence, if the learning costs to acquire general knowledge are relatively high, then a cooperative organization dominates a market organization. Moreover, if the di¤erence in (expected) costs between a situation where a …rm knows about general environmental characteristics and a situation where a …rm has no knowledge about these characteristics is relatively high then a cooperative form is more e¢ cient than a market organization. In addition, a relative high speci…city of investment, a high exogenous world market price and a relative high number of …rms also render a cooperative organization more e¢ cient.
By comparing a hierarchical to a cooperative organization, we have shown that a hierarchy is less e¢ cient if the learning costs to acquire idiosyncratic knowledge are relatively low compared to the expected costs in case of not learning. The ine¢ ciency stems from the fact that in a hierarchy the individual subsidiary has no incentive to produce optimally. Centralization leads to a situation where subsidiaries do not bear the costs of being ine¢ cient. We believe that in many industries cooperatives are formed in order to prevent these ine¢ ciencies. In fact, we agree with Bonus (1986) that idiosyncratic knowledge might be an important ingredient a¤ecting a …rm's success. Dictating instructions by a central company in a hierarchy could destroy …rm-or labour-speci…c knowledge based on experience.
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